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We herein advance a secure steganographic algorithm that uses a turnover policy and a novel adjusting process. Although the
method of Wang et al. uses Pixel-Value Diﬀerencing (PVD) and their modulus function provides high capacity and good image
quality, the embedding process causes a number of artifacts, such as abnormal increases and fluctuations in the PVD histogram,
which may reveal the existence of the hidden message. In order to enhance the security of the algorithm, a turnover policy is
used that prevents abnormal increases in the histogram values and a novel adjusting process is devised to remove the fluctuations
at the border of the subrange in the PVD histogram. The proposed method therefore eliminates all the weaknesses of the PVD
steganographic methods thus far proposed and guarantees secure communication. In the experiments described herein, the
proposed algorithm is compared with other PVD steganographic algorithms by using well-known steganalysis techniques, such
as RS-analysis, steganalysis for LSB matching, and histogram-based attacks. The results support our contention that the proposed
method enhances security by keeping the PVD histogram similar to the cover, while also providing high embedding capacity and
good imperceptibility to the naked eye.
1. Introduction
Steganography is a method of secret communication in
which a message is embedded in a cover, such as text or
an image. Message embedding is performed in spatial or
frequency domain. One of the representative data hiding
methods in spatial domain is to use the least significant bit
(LSB), such as LSB replacement or LSB matching. Transform
domain steganographic methods employ the well-known
transformation techniques such as Discrete Cosine Trans-
form (DCT), Fourier Transform (FT), or Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT). Spatial domain methods are simpler
and have a large capacity while transform domain methods
are more robust compared to spatial domain method. The
key factors for the secure communication are high security,
high embedding capacity, and good imperceptibility to the
naked eye. In order to satisfy these requirements, a number
of diﬀerent steganographic algorithms have been developed
with the primary aim of maintaining the characteristics of
the cover image such as histogram to avoid any statistical
attack [1–3].
Steganalysis schemes can be classified into two categories:
specific and universal steganalysis. Due to the fact that
specific steganalysis attempts to detect a specific target
steganography [4, 5], it has high performance when tested
only on that precise embedding method. Universal steganal-
ysis is designed to reveal a hidden message regardless of
the steganographic algorithm used [6–8]. Although universal
steganalysis performs slightly worse than specific steganalysis
techniques where the stego method is assumed known, it
nevertheless yields acceptable results. Universal steganalysis
therefore appears to be the more practical solution.
In order to resist detection by well-known steganalytic
techniques, such as RS-analysis [4], and to take account of
2 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
the properties of the human visual system, Wu and Tsai [9]
proposed a Pixel-Value Diﬀerencing (PVD) steganography
that embeds more bits into pairs that have large PVD values,
such as those found in edge areas. Although this method
provides high embedding capacity and invisibility, it creates
step eﬀects in the PVD histogram and embedded messages
may be detected. A modified version of PVD steganography
was presented by Zhang and Wang [10], which removed
the step eﬀects by varying the lower and upper bounds of
the subrange using a pseudorandom parameter β(∈ [0, 1]).
Since the random expansion of the subrange allowed fewer
bits to be embedded for the same diﬀerence values and
decreased the changing quantity of the pixel value, Zhang
and Wang’s method had lower embedding capacity but better
quality than Wu and Tsai’s. Though it made the histogram
smooth, it was still detected by Sabeti et al. by the use
of one-more-time embedding and neural networks [11].
Although a hybrid steganography was proposed using LSB
steganography at flat areas and PVD steganography at edge
areas in order to increase the embedding capacity [12], it
still contained step eﬀects and was detected by applying a χ2-
attack on the PVD histogram [13]. More recently, a stegano-
graphic algorithm using PVD and the modulus function was
presented by Wang et al. [14], in which the remainder of two
consecutive pixels was changed to match the decimal value
of the message bits. However, the embedding process created
fluctuations and abnormal increases, which destroyed the
symmetry of the PVD histogram. Wang et al.’s method
was therefore detected using a PVD histogram-based attack
[15]. Yang et al. suggested the adaptive LSB steganographic
method using PVD to determine the length of the message
bits [16], which divides the range of diﬀerence values into
lower, middle, and higher levels.
In our assessment of all the previous PVD stegano-
graphic techniques described herein, we found that detection
occurred because the embedding process changed the PVD
histogram too severely. In order to achieve the required
level of security, the embedding process must avoid those
attacks that exploit modifications to the PVD histogram and
eliminate all artifacts generated by the embedding process.
In view of these assessments, the aim of this paper is
to introduce improvements on Wang et al.’s method in
terms of higher capacity and lower detectability, while being
secure against well-known steganalytic methods. The use
of the modulus function improves capacity by overcoming
the falling-oﬀ-boundary problem and provides good image
quality by minimizing the changes in pixel values [17, 18].
The proposed method makes two main contributions to
steganographic technique: a turnover policy and a novel
adjusting process. The turnover policy yields histograms
close to those of the cover image and maintains the symmetry
of the PVD histogram. The novel adjusting process helps to
remove fluctuations around the border of the subrange. The
proposed method therefore maintains the PVD histogram
similar to that of the cover and is secure against RS-analysis
[4], steganalysis for LSB matching [5], and histogram-
based steganalysis that focuses on PVD steganographic
methods [10, 15]. Furthermore, high capacity and good
imperceptibility are achieved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides a review of Wang et al.’s steganographic
algorithm and describes its weaknesses in the face of
steganalytic measures. In Section 3, we present our secure
steganographic algorithm, including a turnover policy and
a novel adjusting process. Experimental results are presented
in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2. Review of Wang et al.’s Method
2.1. Wang et al.’s Steganographic Algorithm. For high embed-
ding capacity and good image quality, Wang et al. proposed
steganography using PVD and a modulus function [14]. It
modifies the remainder of two consecutive pixels instead of
the diﬀerence between them.
In order to embed the message bits, five parameters are
obtained for each subblock Fi, each of which is composed
of two consecutive pixels (P(i,x),P(i,y)) using Wu and Tsai’s
scheme [9], namely, the diﬀerence di = P(i,y) − P(i,x), the
subrange Rk such that Rk ∈ [lk,uk] and lk ≤ di ≤ uk,
the width wk = uk − lk + 1, the embedding capacity ti
(bits), and the decimal value t′i of ti message bits. The
remainder values Frem(i) are then calculated by dividing
(P(i,x) + P(i,y)) by 2ti . A range table R provides data on the
embedding capacity of each sub-block Fi and is composed
of n contiguous subranges Rk (0 ≤ k < n). ti bits of secret
data S are embedded into Fi by altering P(i,x) and P(i,y)
such that Frem(i) = t′i , using the approach that achieves
the minimum distortion. When the stego pixel values
(P′(i,x),P
′
(i,y)) do not overflow the boundary of the grayscale
pixel value ([0 255]), the embedding process is completed
following the replacement of (P(i,x),P(i,y)) by (P′(i,x),P
′
(i,y))





and P′(i,y) are revised by adding 2
(ti−1), subtracting 2(ti−1),
or shifting the overflowing values. Since (P′(i,x),P
′
(i,y)) can
be corrected, the range of the revised stego pixel values
(P′′(i,x),P
′′
(i,y)) may neither fall below 0 nor rise above 255.
Finally, the embedding process is completed by replacing
(P(i,x),P(i,y)) in the cover image by (P′′(i,x),P
′′
(i,y)).
In order to extract the message bits, the receiver obtains
the diﬀerence di between two consecutive pixels (P(i,x),P(i,y)).
di determines the subrange index k, the width wk of the
subrange by wk = uk − lk + 1 and the length ti of the message
bits. After computing the remainder value using Frem(i) =
(P(i,x) +P(i,y)) mod 2ti , the extraction algorithm is completed
by transforming the remainder value Frem(i) into a binary
string of length ti.
2.2. Steganalytical Weaknesses of Wang et al.’s Method. In
[15], we presented three steganalytic measures to detect a
message that was embedded using Wang et al.’s method.
Although Wang et al.’s method achieves high embedding
capacity and good imperceptibility, the significant changes
in the PVD histogram reveal the existence of the messages.
Let h and h′ be the PVD histogram of the cover and
the stego images, respectively. In addition, the estimated his-
togram is denoted by he. d (−255 ≤ d ≤ 255,d ∈ N) is the
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diﬀerence between the two pixels. Table 1 shows an example
of how the pixel pair changes when the message value is
embedded using Wang et al.’s method. After embedding the
messages, the diﬀerence of two stego pixels is changed by
1, at most. For example, if the cover pixel pair is (9, 8), its
original diﬀerence is −1 and the diﬀerence of the stego pixel
pair becomes −1 or 0. In general, in a negative area (d < 0),
d is changed to d or (d + 1), while in a positive area (d > 0),
d is changed to d or (d − 1). This means that the absolute
value of the diﬀerence between two pixels is unchanged or
decreased by 1 after embedding. However, since there are no
absolute values smaller than 0, a change of h(0) violates the
general modification rule. We therefore model the changes in
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·h(d + 1), if d > 1,
(1)
where α is the embedding rate.
The weaknesses of Wang et al.’s method are caused by
these changes in the PVD histogram. Since there are some
special cases that do not follow the general modification rule
of (1), h′ around the lower and upper bound of the subrange












· h(lk + 1)+ α2 · h(lk + 2),
(2)
where uk and lk are the upper and lower bound of the kth
subrange. h′(uk−1) decreases and h′(lk + 1) increases after the
message is embedded. The first steganalytic measure (SM1)
checks the fluctuation using (3):
SM1 = h
′(−9)− h′(−7)
h′(−7) × 100. (3)
Because the width of each subrange is taken to be a power
of 2, −8 is the common border in the various range tables.
Since the PVD histogram value h(d) decreases by increasing
|d| in a macroscopically smooth fashion [9], two points
(−7,−9) adjacent to the common border (−8) are used to
obtain the maximum diﬀerence. In order to normalize and
maximize the eﬀects of the message embedding, h′(−7) is
used as the divisor.
Due to the fact that the diﬀerence histogram for natural
images without embedding the message follows a Gaussian
distribution [19], the PVD histogram has bilateral symmetry
about zero. The second steganalytic measure (SM2) therefore
checks the asymmetry using (4).
SM2 = h
′(1)− h′(−1)
h′(−1) × 100. (4)
As shown in (1), since h′(1) and h′(−1) is obtained
from 3 bins (h(0),h(1),h(2)) and 2 bins (h(−1),h(−2)) of
the original PVD histogram, respectively, h′(1) is higher
than h′(−1). Therefore, SM2 of the cover image is close to
0 and SM2 of the stego image is very much higher than 0.
After the message has been embedded using Wang et al.’s
method, h′(0) is generated from 3 bins (h(−1),h(0),h(1))
and increases significantly. The third steganalytic measure






where he(0) is estimated close to the original value using the
curve-fitting methods of three well-known models described
in [15]. Thus, SM3 of the cover image is close to 0.
However, Wang et al.’s embedding process increases both
h′(0) and SM3.
The values of the three steganalytic measures for the
cover and stego images can be separated from each other
and can hence reveal the existence of the hidden messages
embedded using Wang et al.’s method without the cover
images. The performance of the steganalytic measures used
is described and verified by experiment (see Figure 7).
3. Proposed Steganography
Preserving the PVD Histogram
To achieve secure steganography, the PVD histogram of the
stego image should preserve the statistical properties of the
cover image as well as possessing good visual quality. This
section presents an improvement to Wang et al.’s method
that generates no artifacts in the PVD histogram after
embedding the message and is not detected using well-
known steganalytic techniques or PVD histogram-based
attacks. Firstly, the improved embedding algorithm with the
turnover policy and the novel adjusting process is explained
and then the extraction algorithm is presented without the
cover images.
3.1. Embedding Algorithm. In order to provide high embed-
ding capacity, good imperceptibility to the naked eye, and
improved security, the modulus function is adopted and
the weaknesses of Wang et al.’s method are eliminated
through a turnover policy and a novel adjusting process.
When embedding the message bits into two consecutive
pixels (P(i,x),P(i,y)), m is the diﬀerence between the remain-
der of two pixels’ sum and the message value. If the
modifying value m is odd, the two pixels are modified
by m/2 and m/2 + 1, respectively. The turnover policy
allocates the significant distortion (m/2 + 1) to P(i,x) or
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Table 1: Changes in pixel values when embedding the message value using Wang et al.’s method. The diﬀerence di between two stego pixels
remains intact or is modified by ±1.
(P(i,x),P(i,y))
Decimal message value
Changes of diﬀerence di
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(10, 8) (9, 7) (9, 8) (10, 8) (10, 9) (11, 9) (11, 10) (12, 10) (8, 7) −2⇒ −2, −1
(9, 8) (8, 8) (9, 8) (9, 9) ( 10, 9 ) (10, 10) (11, 10) (7, 7) (8, 7) −1⇒ −1, 0
(8, 8) (8, 8) (8, 9) (9, 9) (9, 10) (10, 10) (6, 7) (7, 7) (7, 8) 0⇒ 0, 1
(8, 9) (8, 8) (8, 9) (9, 9) (9, 10) (10, 10) (10, 11) (7, 7) (7, 8) 1⇒ 1, 0
(8, 10) (7, 9) (8, 9) (8, 10) (9, 10) (9, 11) (10, 11) (10, 12) (7, 8) 2⇒ 2, 1
P(i,y) in turn. Therefore, the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between two pixels can be decreased or increased. Since the
diﬀerence between two pixels may be altered in a positive or
negative way, the new histogram h′(d) of the stego image is
obtained from 3 bins (h(d−1),h(d),h(d+ 1)) of the original
histogram (refer to Table 2). Consequently, the turnover
policy prevents h′(0) and h′(1) from increasing abnormally
and helps to make the PVD histogram symmetric about zero
in a similar way to the cover. As a result, SM2 and SM3, as
described in Section 2.2, are no longer eﬀective. Our novel
adjusting process is applied to solve the out-of-subrange
problem, which opens the algorithm to possible detection
by SM1. Whereas Wang et al.’s method creates fluctuations
around the border of the subrange, the proposed adjusting
process eliminates these. Therefore, the proposed method is
secure against detection by SM1.
The overall embedding process is shown in Figure 1.
The proposed steganographic algorithm consists of four
steps, namely, the pixel pairing step, the embedding step,
the adjusting step, and the overcoming step. The pixel
pairing step vectorizes the pixel pairs and permutates the
sub-blocks. At the embedding step, the message bits are
embedded into the pixel pair using the modulus function
and turnover policy. The adjusting step employs our novel
adjusting process when the diﬀerence in the new pixel pair
is below or above the subrange. Finally, the falling-oﬀ-
boundary problem is solved at the overcoming step. The
embedding process is repeated until no messages or pixel
pairs remain.
Firstly, in the pixel pairing step, the cover image is
partitioned into nonoverlapping sub-blocks composed of
two consecutive pixels by Zigzag scan. To enhance the
security, the sub-blocks are permutated.
In the embedding step, the remainder of two pixels is
simply modified to match the message value. Given that the
modulus function is used, the proposed method reduces or
increases the pixel value to match the residue of the pixel pair
to the decimal message value t′i . m is a modifying value used




























where Frem(i) is the remainder of the sum of the two pixels
(P(i,x) + P(i,y)) divided by the width wk of subrange Rk. In


















P(i,x) +rc,P(i,y) + r f
)
,
if i is odd number;
(
p(i,x)+r f , p(i,y) + rc
)
,
if i is even number,
(7)
where m is the modifying value obtained from (6), rc =
m/2	, and r f = m/2. Since the turnover policy is
employed in (7) to obtain the new stego pixels (P′(i,x),P
′
(i,y)),
the changing opportunities are distributed nearly equally
over the two pixels in the sub-block. Each histogram value
therefore has the same probability of being changed, and the
proposed method preserves the shape of the PVD histogram
more closely to that of the cover.
The third (adjusting) step is designed to eliminate the
fluctuations in the PVD histogram. After modifying the pixel
values according to the decimal message value t′i , whether
or not the out-of-subrange problem is present is checked by
investigating whether the new diﬀerence of two stego pixels is
in a diﬀerent subrange. In order to solve the out-of-subrange
problem by preserving the diﬀerence between two pixels, a

































if i is even number,
(8)
where di = P(i,y)−P(i,x), g(p, q) = {p/wk−q}×wk + t′i (q ∈
{−1, 0, 1}), qx = arg minq∈{−1,0,1}|g(P(i,x), q) − P(i,x)|, qy =
arg minq∈{−1,0,1}|g(P(i,y), q) − P(i,y)|. In other words, g(p, q)
is the closest value to p among all the values that have a
residue t′i by wk. When the new diﬀerence d
′
i of the altered
pixels (P′(i,x),P
′
(i,y)) is not zero (d
′
i /= 0) and is in the other
subrange or at the border of the subrange (d′i ≤ lk or uk ≤
d′i ), one pixel is modified to embed the message value and
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Table 2: PVD changes after embedding, using Wang et al.’s method










. . . . . . . . . . . .
−2 (−2 or −1) (−1 or −2) (−2 or −3)
−1 (−1 or 0) (0 or −1) (−1 or −2)
0 (0 or 1) (1 or 0) (0 or −1)
1 (1 or 0) (0 or 1) (1 or 2)
2 (2 or 1) (1 or 2) (2 or 3)
3 (3 or 2) (2 or 3) (3 or 4)
4 (4 or 3) (3 or 4) (4 or 5)
5 (5 or 4) (4 or 5) (5 or 6)
6 (6 or 5) (5 or 6) (6 or 7)
7 (7 or 6) (6 or 7) (7 or 7)
8 (8 or 9) (8 or 8) (8 or 9)
9 (9 or 8) (8 or 9) (9 or 10)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
the other pixel is adjusted to maintain the PVD. Therefore,
the proposed method can maintain h′(uk) and h′(lk + 1)
similar to h(uk) and h(lk+1), respectively. There is no need to
apply the proposed adjusting process at the subrange which
is greater than 128 because the histogram value is very small
(close to 0). Due to the fact that the proposed adjusting
process is able to remove the fluctuations around the border
of the subrange, this weakness of Wang et al.’s method is
eliminated and secure communication can be guaranteed.
Table 2 shows how the diﬀerence value of the pixel pair
is changed after the messages have been embedded. The
changes of the diﬀerence value represent the weaknesses of
Wang et al.’s method and the advantages of the proposed
method. In Wang et al.’s method, the new diﬀerence value
d′i appears once (7), twice, or three times (0, 1). However,
since the proposed method increases or decreases the diﬀer-
ence value, every d′i appears four times. Consequently, the
proposed method ensures a balance of changing opportunity
for the diﬀerence value through the turnover policy and the
novel adjusting process. It avoids histogram-based attacks by
keeping the PVD histogram of the cover.
The fourth (overcoming) step is carried out in order
to deal with the falling-oﬀ-boundary problem. If the pixel
value is out of boundary [0 255] after the adjusting step, the
overcoming step revises the pixels as follows.
Case 1. P′(i,x) < 0 and P
′













Case 2. P′(i,x) < 0 and P
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Case 3. P′(i,x) > 255 and P
′








P′(i,x) − z,P′(i,y) − z
)
. (11)
Case 4. P′(i,x) > 255 and P
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This overcoming step was devised for P′(i,x). In case of P
′
(i,y),
we apply the same technique by substituting P′(i,x) with P
′
(i,y).
If the stego pixel pair is obtained without using the adjusting
process, the overcoming value z is half of the width, in order
to preserve the remainder of the summation of the values of
the two pixels. However, if the diﬀerence of the stego pixel
pair is equal to the lower or upper bound of the subrange, z
is equal to the whole width of the subrange that is required,
so as not to change the remainder of each pixel. Most falling-
oﬀ-boundary problems may be categorized as Case 1 or Case
3. However, since the solution of Case 1 and Case 3 can make
another falling-oﬀ-boundary problem when the diﬀerence
is greater than 128, Case 2 and Case 4 are designed. For
example, if the pixel pair of the cover is (255, 43) and message
value is 66, the underflow problem occurs after solving the
overflow problem by Case 3. To overcome this special case,
Case 4 is applied and the new stego pixel pair is finally to be
(255, 67).
After the overcoming step, the next pixel pair is selected
and the embedding algorithm is applied repeatedly until no
messages or pixel pairs remain.
3.2. Extracting Algorithm. The embedded messages are sim-
ply extracted from the sum of two pixels or from one
pixel. This extraction algorithm performs blind, without the
cover. The sender and receiver must share the range table R.
The diﬀerence di is computed from two consecutive pixels
(P(i,x),P(i,y)) and determines the subrange index k, width wk,
and message length ti. If di is not zero and equal to lk or uk,
the message value t′i is extracted merely by computing the
residue of P(i,x) or P(i,y) by wk. If not, t′i is the remainder value
of the sum of two pixel values by wk. The extracting process
for two pixels is completed by transforming the message
value t′i into a binary stream of length ti. The extracting
algorithm is performed repeatedly until no messages or pixel
pairs remain.
The message can be extracted correctly even though
the proposed method tries to embed the message bits into
the stego image again, that is, at double embedding. As
shown in Figure 2, two pixel values are flexibly adjusted
according to the message value. The receiver can extract
the hidden message correctly, regardless of the original pixel
pair. Therefore, the proposed method guarantees secure
communication.
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Cover image
Stego image
1. Pixel pairing step
Vectorize the pixel pair






































Figure 1: Overall message embedding process showing the pixel paring step, the embedding step, the adjusting step, and the overcoming
step.
Sender











(33 + 34) %8
(a) Message is embedded into the cover-image
Sender
Cover image Stego image Stego-stego image
(32, 32)











(32 + 35) %8
(b) Double embedding: Message is embedded into the stego image
Figure 2: Receiver can extract the hidden message correctly whether the message is embedded into the cover image (a) or stego image (b).
4. Experimental Results
In order to verify the minimum changes of the PVD his-
togram, the proposed method was compared with the meth-
ods of Wu and Tsai [9], Zhang and Wang [10], Wang et al.
[14], and Yang et al. [16]. The stego images were generated
using the range table R in Table 3. In Yang et al.’s method
[16], the parameters for the lower, middle, and higher levels
were set as (2-3-4). The security was tested using RS-analysis
[4], steganalysis for LSB matching[5], and the histogram-
based [10, 15]. Eight grayscale images of size 512× 512 were
tested: Baboon, Boat, Elaine, House, Jet, Lake, Lena, and
Peppers. Figure 3 shows the cover images, the stego images
generated by our method, and the diﬀerence images scaled
thirty times between the cover and stego images. As shown
in the figure, most of the distortions are found on the edge
areas and no artifact can be distinguished by the human eye.
In Figure 4, the PVD histograms obtained for the cover
and stego images are compared for our eight test images.








(e) Jet (f) Lake (g) Lena (h) Peppers
Figure 3: The eight test images, the corresponding stego images obtained using the proposed method, and the diﬀerence images scaled 30
times between the cover and stego images.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the PVD histogram between the cover and the stego image.
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Table 3: Range table R. lk and uk are the lower and upper bound of
the subrange, respectively.
index (k) 0 1 2 3 4 5
[lk uk] [0 7] [8 15] [16 31] [32 63] [64 127 ] [128 255]
hiding
bits (ti)
3 3 4 5 6 7
Table 4: Mean of distance measures between the PVD histogram of
the cover and that of the stego images for the eight test images.














Proposed 4091.3 956.9 100.8
In Wang et al.’s method, the shapes of the PVD histograms
of the stego images are clearly distinguished from those
of the cover images because of the fluctuations and the
abnormal increases. However, our proposed method kept the
PVD histogram close to the cover and did not generate any
artifacts.
4.1. Statistical Analysis of the PVD Histogram Diﬀerence.
Table 4 summarizes the mean of the distance measures
between the PVD histogram of the cover and that of the
stego images which are obtained from the various PVD-
based methods for the eight test images. This enables
the similarity between the cover and stego images to be
compared in a statistical way. Although Zhang and Wang’s
method maintained the symmetry, the PVD histogram was
diﬀerent from that of the cover because of the smoothness
eﬀects. Wu and Tsai’s method and Wang et al.’s method had
high values because of modifications such as step eﬀects,
fluctuations, and abnormal increases. However, the proposed
method had the smallest value in statistical terms among all
the PVD steganographic methods considered here.
4.2. Security under RS-Steganalysis. The security of the pro-
posed method under the well-known RS-analysis technique
is shown in Figure 5. RS-analysis defines a discrimination
function DF and flipping mask M. RM is the proportion of
blocks in which the magnitude of DF increases when DF1
is applied to a part of each block, and SM is the proportion
of blocks with decreasing magnitude of DF. Similarly, two
other parameters R−M and S−M are defined when DF−1 is
applied to a part of each block. If the image does not contain
secret data, RM ≈ R−M > SM ≈ S−M . When the messages are
embedded into the least significant bits (LSBs) of the image,
R−M and SM increase, whereas RM and S−M decrease, and
the existence of the hidden message is therefore revealed. In















(a) RS analysis for the stego-Lena using the proposed method per each
embedding rate


















Yang et al.’s method
Proposed method
(b) RS detection values for the massive images
Figure 5: (a) RS-analysis for the stego-Lena image using the
proposed method and (b) RS detection values of the cover images,
using the LSB replacement, the Yang et al.’s, and the proposed
method for 500 randomly chosen images.








as M and −M,
respectively. As shown in Figure 5(a), since the proposed
method changes the pixel values instead of the LSB to embed
the message, RM and SM were similar to R−M and S−M ,
respectively. Figure 5(b) shows that the RS detection values
((|RM − R−M| + |SM − S−M|)/(RM + SM)) for the cover and
the proposed method were close to 0, whereas those of the
LSB replacement method [20] and the Yang et al.’s method
[16] were very much higher than 0. The proposed method
is therefore also secure against RS-analysis, in common with
other PVD methods.
4.3. Security Analysis under Steganalysis for LSB Matching.
Since the pixel value is changed in order to embed the
messages, the proposed method was tested under attack for
LSB matching steganography. Steganalysis for LSB match-
ing in grayscale images was presented in 2005 by Ker
[5], who used the fact that the Histogram Characteristic
Function-Center Of Mass (HCF-COM) of downsampled
stego image C′(H[k]) would be greater than that of full-
sized one C(H[k]). The Histogram Characteristic Function
(HCF)H[k] was obtained by calculating the Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT) of the histogram of the input image. The
Center Of Mass (COM) of the HCF was calculated using
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Table 5: Histogram-based attacks can be performed separately on the odd and even rows. The values of the proposed method are similar to
the cover while those of the Wang et al.’s method are very higher than the cover.
SM1 SM2
Even row Odd row Even row Odd row
Cover Wang Proposed Cover Wang Proposed Cover Wang Proposed Cover Wang Proposed
Baboon −15.0 173.5 −14.8 −9.1 151.0 −16.3 2.9 54.7 4.0 −0.6 52.6 4.6
Boat −27.2 123.9 −28.6 −27.3 122.2 −26.7 −4.5 52.5 −3.0 2.7 54.6 1.9
Elaine −21.1 148.7 −19.2 −23.4 126.3 −26.5 −3.1 49.1 0.2 −2.2 52.5 −4.6
House −32.6 128.3 −35.7 −28.3 127.6 −30.9 9.3 100.2 9.5 7.6 95.0 4.6
Jet −42.4 77.3 −41.8 −47.6 69.8 −48.3 3.0 72.3 2.6 2.6 75.3 −0.6
Lake −23.2 125.3 −29.7 −24.6 135.1 −28.7 −4.8 48.1 0.0 2.9 59.4 2.3
Lena −41.2 79.2 −40.0 −39.2 89.3 −41.5 3.8 66.6 4.8 5.6 68.8 5.9
Peppers −32.4 105.0 −34.6 −33.0 109.3 −34.6 1.0 53.7 −0.9 2.4 51.1 0.8
Table 6: Comparison of hiding capacity (bytes) and visual quality (dB).
Wu [9] Zhang [10] Wang [14] Yang [16] Proposed
Lmax PSNR Lmax PSNR Lmax PSNR Lmax PSNR Lmax PSNR
Baboon 57,028 37.0 53,586 40.4 57,043 40.2 80,688 39.6 57,043 39.2
Boat 52,320 39.6 50,926 42.4 52,490 41.1 71,788 42.1 52,490 41.0
Elaine 50,891 42.1 49,750 44.5 50,893 44.9 68,994 43.6 50,893 43.5
House 52,418 40.0 51,003 42.7 52,572 42.4 72,043 42.0 52,572 41.5
Jet 51,221 40.6 50,366 43.5 51,221 43.4 69,415 42.9 51,221 42.8
Lake 52,614 40.0 50,970 42.7 52,662 42.4 72,304 41.9 52,662 41.5
Lena 50,894 41.5 50,023 44.3 50,894 43.4 68,927 43.3 50,894 43.4
Peppers 50,657 41.5 49,968 43.9 50,815 43.4 68,632 43.4 50,815 42.5























Figure 6: HCF-COM ratio of the full-sized images to the downsam-
pled images for the cover images, obtained using the LSB matching,
the Yang et al.’s, and the proposed method.
C(H[k]) = ∑ni=0 i|H[i]|/
∑n
i=0 |H[i]|. This parameter gives
general information about the energy distribution in the
HCF. The discriminator used to diﬀerentiate stego images
from cover images is C(H[k])/C′(H[k]). Figure 6 plots the
detector values of the HCF-COM ratios for 100 randomly
selected natural images from the NRCS image database [21]
that satisfyC(H[k]) ≈ C′(H[k]). The discriminator values of
the stego images obtained using the proposed method were
close to 1, similar to the cover images, while the values of
the stego images obtained using the LSB matching method
and the Yang et al.’s method were, on average, 0.76 and 0.80,
respectively. This means that the proposed method is secure
against calibrated HCF-COM attack of steganalysis for LSB
matching.
4.4. Security Analysis under the PVD Histogram-Based
Attacks. Zhang and Wang insisted that the steps at [7 8],
[15 16], [31 64], and [127 128] in the PVD histograms
clearly revealed the presence of the hidden message [10].
This assertion was based on the step eﬀects generated by the
embedding process used in Wu and Tsai’s method. However,
since our proposed method produces no step eﬀects and the
PVD histogram after embedding is very similar to the cover,
as in Figure 4, it is impossible to detect the existence of the
hidden message using Zhang and Wang’s analysis.
Figure 7 shows the results for the three steganalytic
measures described in Section 2.2. Wang et al.’s method
produced very much higher values than the cover and was
easily detected by our three steganalytic measures. However,
the steganalytic measures of the stego images generated by
the proposed method were very close to the cover. These
results support our contention that the proposed method
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Figure 7: Three steganalytic measures of the cover, using Wang et al.’s and our proposed method.
removes all the weaknesses of Wang et al.’s method and is
secure under PVD histogram-based attacks.
The histogram-based attack can be performed separately
on the odd rows and even rows of the stego images. Because
of the permutation of the sub-blocks in the first pixel pairing
step of the proposed method, the SM1 and SM2 values of
the stego image produced by the proposed scheme were
similar to those of the cover image as shown in Table 5.
Consequently, the proposed method is secure under the
separate attack of the steganalytic measures described in
Section 2.2.
4.5. Hiding Capacity and Perceptual Quality Analysis. As
previously mentioned, eﬀective steganography must possess
high embedding capacity and good imperceptibility to the
naked eye. Table 6 presents the maximum capacity (Lmax)
and PSNR values for the PVD steganographic methods
discussed herein. Although the PSNR values of our proposed
method were slightly lower than those of Wang et al.’s
method for the same capacity, our method nevertheless
provides a good image quality for the human visual system
because the human eye cannot see the decline in quality
of stego images when PSNR values are over 38 dB [22].
In other words, a slightly lower PSNR than Wang et al.’s
method is almost insignificant in terms of quality. Both
Zhang and Wang’s and Wang et al.’s method had already
defeated, despite the high PSNR values. Even though Yang
et al.’s method can provide the high capacity and good image
quality, it is vulnerable under the LSB steganalysis such as RS-
analysis (see Figure 5) and Ker’s calibrated HCF-COM attack
(see Figure 6). However, our proposed method achieved the
high hiding capacity and security compared with the other
PVD steganographic methods by sacrificing only a little
visual quality.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a secure steganographic method with a
turnover policy and a novel adjusting process was proposed,
in order to enhance the security of stego images. The method
improves upon Wang et al.’s method. The turnover policy
helps to minimize the distortion and remove abnormal
increases in the PVD histogram. The novel adjusting process
eliminates the fluctuations around the border of the sub-
range. As a result, the proposed method can both maintain
a PVD histogram similar to that of the cover and preserve
the statistical properties of the PVD histogram, such as
symmetry or a Gaussian-like shape. Therefore, compared
with the methods of Wu and Tsai, Zhang and Wang, Wang
et al., and Yang et al., our proposed method yields the
least diﬀerences in the PVD histograms between the cover
and stego images. Since the embedding process produces no
artifacts for detection by steganalysis, and the steganalytic
detector values are similar to those of the cover, our
proposed method guarantees secure communication with a
high embedding capacity and good imperceptibility to the
naked eye. The experimental results support the contention
that the proposed method shows the best similarity in the
PVD histogram between the cover and the stego image and
is secure against the various well-known steganalyses such
as RS-analysis, steganalysis for LSB matching, and PVD
histogram-based attacks.




d: Diﬀerence between two pixels of the
sub-block
h: PVD histogram of the cover image
h′ : PVD histogram of the stego image
he: Estimated PVD histogram of the
suspicious image
i: Selecting sequence of the sub-blocks
k: Index of the range table R
lkv Lower bound of the subrange Rk
m: Modifying value to embed the message
ti: Length of embedding bits
t′i : Decimal value of ti message bits
uk: Upper bound of the subrange Rk
wk: Width of the subrange Rk
z: Overcoming value to solve the
falling-oﬀ-boundary problem
C(H[k]): Center Of Mass (COM) of the HCF of the
full-sized image.
C′(H[k]): Center Of Mass (COM) of the HCF of the
down-sampled image
DF: Discrimination function of the
RS-steganalysis
F: Cover image
Fi: ith sub-block of the cover image
Frem(i): Remainder value of Fi
H[k]: Histogram Characteristic Function (HCF)
Lmax: Maximum embedding capacity
M: Flipping mask
(P(i,x),P(i,y)): Two pixels of Fi in the cover image
(P′(i,x),P
′
(i,y)): New stego pixel values of Fi
R: Range table
RM : Proportion of blocks with increasing
magnitude of DF under M
R−M : Proportion of blocks with increasing
magnitude of DF under –M
S: Secret data to be embedded
SM : Proportion of blocks with decreasing
magnitude of DF under M
S−M : Proportion of blocks with decreasing
magnitude of DF under –M
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